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I. Introduction 
Business development and retention are an ongoing challenge for rural communities in Iowa and 
throughout the United States. Low population density and remoteness of rural areas limit local 
demand and make it difficult for start-ups to access sufficient capital, infrastructure, and 
educated labor (Reynolds et al. 1995). Firm entry rates are typically lower in rural areas than 
urban areas and the types of firm start-ups in rural areas tend not to be high growth enterprises 
(Henderson 2002; Plummer and Headd 2008). 
Business succession, a key piece of retention, is likewise difficult in rural areas. The grown 
children of rural family-owned operations often have established careers and little interest in 
succeeding their parents in running a ”small-town” business. Selling a rural firm may also prove 
challenging; there are typically fewer potential buyers in smaller markets. Some firms report that 
potential buyers are primarily interested in purchasing customer lists and certain firm assets 
without much or any intention of keeping the business open in its current location (Logue 2006). 
One possible strategy for both succession and new business development is employee ownership. 
Fueled by research linking entrepreneurship and regional economic growth (Acs and Armington 
2003; Johnson 2007), policies to foster small business development are an increasingly popular 
rural development strategy (Hoy 1996). Employee ownership, particularly in the form of worker 
cooperatives or 100% employee-owned businesses, can be viewed as a form of collective 
entrepreneurship. New business formation as an employee-owned firm or cooperative may have 
some advantages over formation as a sole proprietorship or partnership. Pooling financial 
resources can raise a substantially greater portion of funding required for start-up and shares the 
risk among many partners, rather than one or two. In addition, acting collectively combines the 
various knowledge and skills of the members involved. In the case of business succession, 
selling to employees provides a tax benefit to the owners (the Internal Revenue Code Section 
1042 rollover). More importantly, it increases the probability that the business will continue to 
exist in its current location, benefitting both the employees themselves and the local community 
(Reynolds 2009). 
While worker cooperatives (or employee-owned cooperatives) are currently rare in the United 
States, examples of successful worker cooperatives are frequently cited in the literature, 
suggesting potential for future development of this type of organization. The majority of worker 
cooperatives identified in this research are located in urban areas. Yet the nature of worker 
cooperatives, typically small numbers of employees and requiring relatively low capital 
investment, may make them a good fit for a variety of rural businesses. Foremost, cooperative 
developers and other practitioners stress that a commitment to the cooperative ideology is a 
necessary ingredient for successful worker cooperatives. Given the strong tradition of 
agricultural and consumer cooperatives in rural America, worker cooperatives would seem to be 
a logical extension of this proven business model in rural areas. 
This paper reviews the literature on worker cooperatives and presents data on the extent and 
nature of worker cooperatives in the United States. It concludes with a discussion of the 
implications for employee-owned cooperative development in Iowa and provides suggestions for 
future research and outreach programming on this topic. 
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II. Worker cooperative basics1 
A worker cooperative is “a business entity that is owned and controlled by the people who work 
in it” according to the United States Federation of Worker Cooperatives (USFWC). As such, it is 
a type of employee-owned firm as well as a type of cooperative and shares features of both. 
While there is not one universally accepted definition of a worker cooperative, three defining 
characteristics emerge: 1) ownership shares2 are purchased by member-employees and the 
membership owns assets collectively; 2) it is operated by the “one person, one vote” principle; a 
member’s control of the cooperative is not proportionate to the member’s investment; and 3) 
members provide their labor as a production input and share the profits of the cooperative based 
on their labor input (USFWC 2008; Northcountry Cooperative Foundation 2006; Padgham 2002). 
The objectives of worker cooperatives typically differ from those of traditional for-profit firms. 
Whereas, conventional firms are assumed to maximize profits, worker cooperatives have an 
explicit purpose to provide employment for their members. Historically, worker cooperatives 
have tended to emerge in times of economic downturn and social upheaval in response to high 
unemployment as a means of preventing plant closings and creating new jobs (Dickstein 1991; 
Horowitz and Horowitz 1999). 
In many cases, the focus of worker cooperatives on providing employment extends beyond 
current membership to future generations. A third generation member of a worker cooperative in 
Italy explained, “‘Part of our mission is intergenerational mutuality. What we see here is the fruit 
of generations of work. We receive wealth from past generations, and we create it for future 
generations of members. Our objective isn’t just to generate jobs for this generation but also for 
future generations.’” (quoted in Corcoran and Wilson 2010). 
Worker cooperatives are viewed as pursuing broader goals than conventional firms. While 
clearly cooperatives must be economically viable in order to persist, they also adhere to 
cooperative principles which include democratic control and self-management, open and 
voluntary membership, and an emphasis on worker education (Dickstein 1991). Creation of 
worker cooperatives has often been driven by factors other than expected economic returns, 
particularly social and economic justice concerns. When asked to define success, respondents to 
a survey of worker cooperatives in Canada listed: longevity, living wages, meaningful work, 
personal development, financial success and profitability, and provision of values-driven 
products (Hough, Wilson and Corcoran 2010). 
Employee ownership is not a simple, one-dimensional concept (Kruse and Blasi 1995). A firm 
might be 100% employee-owned by 30% of the employees or 30% of the employee-owned 
business might be owned by all employees. The definitional lines for what constitutes a 
cooperative are similarly blurry, as rapid evolution in cooperative models has occurred in recent 
years (Chaddad and Cook 2004). There is certainly not one model of a worker cooperative. A 
worker cooperative might employ non-member workers or involve non-worker members (for 
 

 For a comprehensive overview of worker cooperatives characteristics as well as a number of current case studies, 
see Northcountry Cooperative Foundation (2006). In Good Company: A Guide to Cooperative Employee 
Ownership, available online at http://www.ncdf.coop/documents/worker_coop_toolbox.pdf.  
2
 This is usually called common stock. Common stock is distinguished from preferred stock which has limited 
control rights. Nonmember investors can have preferred stock.  
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example, external investors who by virtue of their financial stake in the company have some say 
in company decision making, but who do not work for the firm). Worker cooperatives vary in 
their policies regarding who may become a member and how membership is attained; in the 
ways in which they allocate profits among members; in their governance structure; and in their 
policies regarding non-member investment. These characteristics are discussed briefly below. 
Initial Investment: To become a member, eligible workers purchase an initial share. The share 
price can be very low (for example, $50) in service related cooperatives like home care and taxi 
services that do not require large capital investments. Keeping membership share prices low also 
encourages broader membership. In other industries, membership requires a more substantial 
financial investment. A membership share in Isthmus Engineering, a worker cooperative in 
Madison, Wisconsin, costs $10,000, which must be financed by the member (Northcountry 
Cooperative Development Fund 2006, 40). Other cooperatives in essence provide financing by 
allowing members to purchase shares over time. Collective Copies, a worker-owned collective in 
Florence, Massachusetts, allows members to pay their $250 membership fee through payroll 
deduction, $5 at a time (Northcountry Cooperative Development Fund 2006, 32). 
Allocation of profits: In cooperatives, members share in the profits of the firm according to 
patronage, rather than investment. In a worker cooperative, patronage is based on the amount of 
labor each employee-member provides to the firm. This may be determined by the number of 
hours worked, by earnings, or by a combination of the two. In addition, seniority can be a factor 
in determining patronage allocations. 
Membership Eligibility: Some worker cooperatives allow every employee to become a member, 
while other cooperatives may restrict the membership opportunity. For example, a cooperative 
may only allow full-time, year-round employees to join as members. The process for obtaining 
membership in a worker cooperative varies as well. Some cooperatives require a probationary 
period, ranging from a few months to multiple years. Other cooperatives allow employees to join 
as members from their first day. In some worker cooperatives, new members must be approved 
by a vote of the current members; other cooperatives grant membership to any employee meeting 
the probationary period requirements. Worker cooperatives also have different rules regarding 
whether CEOs or managers can be members in the cooperative. 
Governance: The member-employees in a worker cooperative control the firm democratically 
(one-member, one-vote). The way in which decisions are made varies across cooperatives. 
Worker cooperatives with few members may have a very “flat” governance structure, in which 
all members make decisions collectively. In essence, all members serve on the cooperative’s 
board of directors. Other worker cooperatives may adopt a hierarchical structure, more like 
larger farmer-owned cooperatives, delegating decision making authority to a board of directors 
elected by the membership and employing managers to handle the day-to-day operations of the 
firm. 
Managers may be appointed from among the current membership or hired externally. Some 
cooperatives do not allow managers or CEOs to be members because they view their roles in the 
cooperative (such as scheduling workers and paying bills) as fundamentally different from the 
roles of members. 
  
Formation: Worker cooperatives have been formed in a variety of ways. A few formed as worker 
cooperatives from the beginning. A number of cooperatives cited as success stories in the 
literature on worker cooperatives formed with assistance from government agencies and/or non-
profit organizations as a way to achieve economic development or social goals. Other worker 
cooperatives have formed due to a conversion from a conventional firm or non-profit. 
The formation of a worker cooperative from inception can occur autonomously, as in the case of 
Union Cab Cooperative of Madison, Wisconsin (Lawless and Reynolds 2004). Experienced 
workers raised start-up funding and operate the worker cooperative. In the case of Union Cab 
Cooperative, the workers established the cooperative to overcome low wages and poor working 
conditions. 
More commonly, the formation of a worker cooperative occurs with assistance from cooperative 
developers, governmental agencies, or non-profit organizations. A cooperative developer can 
assess business feasibility before organizing a new cooperative, and provides organizational and 
financial consulting. Some examples of cooperative developers who have assisted with the 
development of worker cooperatives are Cooperative Development Institute, South Deerfield, 
Massachusetts;3 Northwest Cooperative Development Center, Olympia, Washington;4 Women’s 
Action to Gain Economic Security (WAGES), Oakland, California (Todd 2007); and Evergreen 
Cooperative, Cleveland, Ohio (Alperovitz, Howard, and Dubb 2009). Government agencies can 
also play the role of cooperative developer. In the case of Cooperative Care, the Department of 
Human Services in Waushara, Wisconsin, assisted with writing a business plan and helped to 
incorporate the new worker cooperative (Bau 2003). A more recent example involves the role of 
the USDA Forest Service in helping facilitate the purchase of one of the largest sawmills in the 
western United States, Intermountain Resources, LLC. In a meeting to discuss options for 
keeping the mill operational, Under Secretary Harris Sherman highlighted the role UDSA’s 
Rural Development Office can play by providing financial assistance through its Business & 
Industry Loan Guarantee Program as well as technical assistance in forming a cooperative 
through its partners, in this case Rocky Mountain Farmers Union Cooperative and Economic 
Development Center (USDA 2010). In many cases, funding providers such as community 
development funds or charitable foundations, play a big role by providing start-up capital in the 
form of a loan to the new cooperative. One example is the Northcountry Cooperative 
Development Fund in Minnesota (Rural Development January/February 2007). 
Worker cooperatives have also formed as a result of conversion from other business types. The 
rationale for conversion varies. Rainbow Grocery Cooperative (RGC), San Francisco, California, 
converted from non-profit to a worker cooperative due to difficulty obtaining bank financing. 
When RGC tried to borrow money from banks to finance an expansion, they found banks were 
 


For an example of CDI’s role in forming a worker cooperative, see http://www.cooperationworks.coop/success-
stories/worker-ownership/building-co-ops-through-timebanking
4
 See NWCDC’s website for examples of their role in developing two home care worker cooperatives: 
http://www.nwcdc.coop/projects.htm 
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
uncomfortable dealing with a business without owners.5 RGC decided to convert to a cooperative 
in 1993 (Lawless and Reynolds 2004). 
Conversion to a worker cooperative may also occur because a business owner desires to give 
current employees an ownership stake in the company. The owners of Burly Design Cooperative 
in Eugene, Oregon, converted their firm to a worker cooperative to fulfill their vision of a more 
democratic workplace with employee involvement (Thompson 2006; Lawless and Reynolds 
2004). Other cooperatives converted from partnerships as a way to share ownership with 
employees. Isthmus Engineering, Madison, Wisconsin, converted to a worker cooperative in the 
early 1980s and Pelham Auto Service, Amherst, Massachusetts, was transformed in 1977 
(Northcountry Cooperative Development Fund 2006). 
Finally, a business may be transformed to a worker cooperative in order to ensure business 
succession, for example, in the event of the owner’s retirement. Owners in Select Machine in 
Brimfield, Ohio, chose to convert their business to a worker cooperative instead of selling to 
potential buyers. They were concerned that outside buyers were mainly interested in their 
customer list and some select assets and would close the plant soon after purchasing the firm 
(Northcountry Cooperative Development Fund 2006). 
Hybrid forms: Solidarity cooperatives, also called worker-community cooperatives, are multiple-
stakeholder cooperatives that have more than one class of patron-owners. Employees, consumers, 
and other interested parties have joint ownership in the solidarity cooperative. Examples of these 
cooperative forms include grocery stores, early childhood education, and home health care 
businesses. For example, the Weaver Street Market in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, is a grocery 
store which has a board of directors consisting of two worker owners and two consumer owners 
(www.weaverstreetmarket.coop). In the United States, a number of multiple stakeholder 
cooperatives have emerged in the sustainable food movement (Lund 2011). 
A relatively new organizational innovation that allows cooperatives to raise capital from non-
member investors has created a different hybrid cooperative form, the limited cooperative 
association (LCA). A handful of states (Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming) have enacted legislation enabling the formation of these entities. Each 
state has somewhat different rules regarding the scope of the operation (for example, some states 
limit these to agricultural related ventures), allocation of voting rights, composition of the board 
of directors, and allocation of profits (Pittman 2008). Table 1 summarizes the differences 
between traditional worker cooperatives and those formed as limited cooperative associations. 
 
 
5
 This episode is from Rainbow Grocery Cooperative (www.rainbow.coop/history2/). 
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Table 1. Comparison between traditional worker cooperative and LCA worker cooperatives. 
Item Description Traditional worker cooperative LCA worker cooperative  
Shares Type of shares Common stock Common stock 
Investor stock 
Amount held by one person One share per member Varies 
Transferability of shares No Yes, if in the bylaws 
Redeemability of shares Yes Common stock is 
redeemable, but investor 
stock is not 
Control Hold voting rights Yes Yes 
Assignment By one member, one vote One person, one vote if it is 
going to be a true worker 
cooperative. Patrons must 
retain at least 50% voting 
control on the board of 
directors 
Returns Allocation Based on hours worked or 
wages earned 
Based on shares held 
Source: Northcountry Cooperative Development Fund (2006) 
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III. The current state of worker cooperatives in the United States 
Worker cooperatives are rare in the United States. A recent study on the economic impact of 
cooperatives by the University of Wisconsin’s Center for Cooperatives identified 223 worker 
cooperatives in the United States, comprising only 1% of all U.S. cooperatives. Among 
cooperative types, they have the lowest average revenue, membership, and employment levels as 
shown in table 2. 
Table 2. Number, average revenue, and average membership of cooperatives by type. 
Cooperative 
Type 
Number 
of Firms 
Percent 
of 
Firms 
Average 
Revenue (in 
thousands of 
dollars) 
Average 
Membership1 
Average 
Number of 
Employees2 
Average 
Annual 
Employee 
Compensation3 
Workers 223 1 983 247 11 $23,282 
Producers 1,494 5 43,793 478 49 $40,724 
Purchasing 724 2 218,083 8,471 180 $22,263 
Consumer 26,844 92 10,844 12,814 24 $29,332 
Total 29,285 100 17,573 11,981 29 $29,210 
Note: The numbers in the table are calculated from data in Table 2.2 in Deller et al. (2009, 11). 
1One member can belong to multiple cooperatives, so these numbers do not necessarily represent unique individuals. 
2
 Employment is reported in terms of full-time employees.  
3 Compensation reported is a sum of wages and benefits, and does not include patronage refunds. Data on patronage 
refunds are not available. 
On average, worker cooperatives have relatively few employees in terms of full-time equivalents. 
The average U.S. worker cooperative has just 11 employees. This is comparable to data from a 
survey of Canadian worker cooperatives that reports the average employment at 12 workers 
(Hough, Wilson, and Corcoran 2010). Comparing the employment figures with membership 
numbers, however, suggests that worker cooperatives have a large number of part-time 
employees. Alternatively, the worker cooperatives in this sample may have a significant number 
of non-worker members, suggesting that these are not “pure” worker cooperatives, but rather 
cooperatives with more than one class of members. 
Based on these data, average compensation for employees in the average worker cooperative is 
larger than that of purchasing cooperatives, but smaller than that of producer and consumer 
cooperatives (see table 3). It is important to note that reported compensation does not include 
patronage refunds; therefore, total employee compensation is understated for worker 
cooperatives in particular. While the Wisconsin study did not report data on patronage refunds, 
case study evidence shows that in some cooperatives, patronage can be substantial. For example, 
the typical annual refund to an employee-member of Pelham Auto Service is $1,500 
(Northcountry Cooperative Development Fund 2006, 36). Annual bonus payments reported in a 
sample of European worker cooperatives ranged from the equivalent of one week’s wages to as 
much as eight week’s wages (Bonin, Jones, and Putterman 1993). In addition, case study 
  
evidence suggests that worker cooperatives are more likely to provide employee benefits than 
similar conventional firms in their industries (Northcountry Cooperative Development Fund 
2006; Whitaker, Schneider, and Bau 2005; Todd 2007). Without data for individual cooperatives, 
it is difficult to make comparisons to non-cooperative firms, especially given that worker 
cooperatives are found in a variety of economic sectors. However, note that 2008 County 
Business Patterns statistics report average employment across all sectors at 16 employees per 
establishment.6 While the average compensation in worker cooperatives is much lower than that 
reported in County Business Patterns across all sectors ($42,435), it is similar to, or higher than 
average compensation reported in sectors which contain a number of worker cooperatives: for 
example, retail trade ($23,650), other services ($26,250) which includes a variety of maintenance 
and repair businesses and personal care services, and accommodation and food services 
($15,363). 
Types of industries: Table 3 presents the number of worker cooperatives by industry sector, 
compiled from a 2008 United States Federation of Worker Cooperatives directory. 7 Worker 
cooperatives exist mainly in the retail and service sectors. Retail and service worker cooperatives 
include small bicycle shops, bookstores, coffee shops and bakeries, fair-trade coffee roasters, and 
taxi companies. They are rare in the manufacturing sector. Roughly 15% of the worker 
cooperatives listed in the USFWC directory are in the arts and media industry. Worker 
cooperatives in books and printing account for 14% of the total, as do food and beverage 
(including bakery) cooperatives. The top five categories account for over 45% of all worker 
cooperatives, collectives, and democratic workplaces listed in the directory. One reason why 
these categories may have organized in greater numbers than other industries is they have 
relatively low capital requirements for start-up and require similar skill levels for all employees 
in the firm. These two characteristics are cited in the literature as potentially important factors for 
success in many worker cooperatives. 
  
 

County Business Patterns data are available online at http://www.census.gov/econ/cbp/index.html). CBP covers 
most of the country's economic activity. Notable exclusions are self-employed individuals, employees of private 
households, railroad employees, agricultural production employees, and most government employees.
7
 The directory gives the approximate number of worker cooperatives since the directory includes collectives and 
democratic workplaces which may or may not be worker cooperatives. As such, these numbers may serve as an 
upper bound. 
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Table 3. Worker cooperatives, collectives and democratic workplaces8 by industry and location. 
Industry Urban Rural Total 
Arts and Media 30 2 32 
Books 17 0 17 
Food and Beverage 16 1 17 
Information Technology 15 0 15 
Building, Construction and Carpentry 12 2 14 
Printing 12 0 12 
Bakery 10 1 11 
Crafts and Textiles 4 4 8 
Grocery 8 0 8 
Healthcare 7 1 8 
Janitorial 8 0 8 
Wellness 7 1 8 
Bicycles Sales and Service 6 0 6 
Education and Childcare 5 1 6 
Energy 6 0 6 
Engineer and Manufacturing 6 0 6 
Agriculture, Forestry and Landscaping 4 1 5 
Courier and Delivery 5 0 5 
Environmental Restoration 4 0 4 
Professional and Contract Service 4 0 4 
Graphic and Web Design 3 0 3 
Taxi 3 0 3 
Shipbuilding and Repair 2 0 2 
Auto Repair 0 1 1 
Imports 1 0 1 
Total 195 15 210 
Source: United States Federation of Worker Cooperatives (2008). Industries are defined by the USFWC. 
 
 
8
 Refer to the meaning of collective and democratic workplace in United States Federation of Worker Cooperatives 
at www.usworker.coop/aboutworkercoops. Collective is a general term for groups with democratic decision-
making. Collectives can be anything from businesses incorporated as regular corporations on paper but with 
democracy in practice to all or partly volunteer-run groups. Often they do not have ownership buy-in or profit-
sharing. Democratic workplaces are businesses and workplaces that are controlled byand/or share profits 
amongtheir workers, that are not formally worker cooperatives. 
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Location: The addresses provided in the USFWC directory were used to classify cooperatives’ 
locations as rural or urban. The classification of urban and rural areas follows the 2004 County 
Typology by the United States Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service 
(www.ers.usda.gov/Data/TypologyCodes). Worker cooperatives tend to be more prevalent in 
urban areas than in rural area (see table 3), but worker cooperatives in crafts and textiles exist in 
urban and rural areas equally. Like conventional firms, market demand may affect the location of 
worker cooperatives. 
Figure 1 displays the distribution of worker cooperatives by state. The map labels the number of 
worker cooperatives identified in each state; for example, 56 worker cooperatives are located in 
California. Seventy percent of the worker cooperatives listed in United States Federation of 
Worker Cooperatives directory are located in just seven states: West Coast states California, 
Oregon, and Washington; Midwestern states Minnesota and Wisconsin; and Northeastern states 
Massachusetts and New York. There are 20 states where no worker cooperatives are located 
(shaded grey in figure 1), including Iowa. 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of Worker Cooperatives by State9.
 
The numbers of worker cooperatives were divided by state population to provide a per capita 
measure. These figures are used to generate the shading in the map; red-shaded states have the 
 

Figure created by the authors using data from the University of Wisconsin’s Center for Cooperatives.
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highest incidence of worker cooperatives per 1 million people. Accounting for population, 
several New England states have relatively high concentrations of worker cooperatives. 
For comparison purposes, figure 2 displays data on the distribution of all cooperatives identified 
in the University of Wisconsin’s Center for Cooperatives study. The locations of worker 
cooperatives differ somewhat from all cooperatives. Notably, Midwestern states with higher 
numbers of total cooperatives per capita, like Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas, and Arkansas, have no 
known worker cooperatives. 
Figure 2. Distribution of Total Cooperatives by State 10 
IV. Distinguishing characteristics of worker cooperatives 
This section explores the similarities and differences between worker cooperatives and other 
business organizations, focusing particularly on a comparison with other employee-owned firms. 
There has been substantial growth in employee ownership in the United States over the past 30 
years due largely to legislative changes in the 1970s that created and gave favorable tax 
treatment to Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) and a change in 1984 that eliminated 
capital gains taxes for business owners who sold at least 30% of their firm to their employees, 
the “1042 rollover” (Blasi et al. 2003). Kruse (2002) estimates that one-fifth of American 
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Figure created by the authors using data from the University of Wisconsin’s Center for Cooperatives.
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workers participate in some form of employee ownership. This growth has helped enhance the 
wealth of U.S. workers and has been an important factor in broadening the distribution of capital 
(stock) ownership in our society (Buchele et al. 2009). 
While employee ownership is growing, relatively few employee-owned firms are majority-
owned by their employees. In the vast majority of public companies, which account for 80% of 
all employee-owned assets, employees have only a small share of their firm’s stock. Ninety-six 
percent of public company ESOPs owned less than 30% of company stock. In contrast, 
significant and majority employee ownership is primarily found in small, privately held family 
and independent businesses. Forty-five percent of private company ESOPs held at least 31% of 
company stock (Blasi et al. 2003). 
The size of employee stakeholding is important. Having a financial stake in a company through 
an ESOP, for example, does not necessarily increase employee motivation when the share is very 
small (Kruse and Blasi 1995). Employee share is also important because it partially determines 
the extent of employee participation and control in company decision making. Greater employee 
participation in workplace decisions is linked to better firm performance and enhanced employee 
motivation, commitment, and job satisfaction in a number of empirical studies (Kruse and Blasi 
1995). Traditional worker cooperatives, by definition, are 100% employee-owned and 
characterized by a high degree of employee participation. 
Thus there are two important dimensions of employee ownership: financial stake in the firm 
(return rights)11 and ability to make decisions regarding management and future direction of the 
business (control rights)12 (Hansmann 2000; Ben-Ner and Jones 1995). There is a great deal of 
variety in the extent to which employees have either or both of these types of ownership rights, 
even among firms that are considered “employee owned.” 
Firms with ESOPs illustrate the range of variation in the degree and type of employee ownership 
according to employee rights to returns and control. There are approximately 10,000 ESOPs in 
 

Return rights grant owners the authority to determine how profits are distributed and to whom. Returns can be 
distributed as dividends, wages, or even improved working conditions (Ben-Ner and Jones 1995). The decision 
making authority implied by this ownership criterion is important in order to distinguish from situations in which 
employees may share in the profits of the firm (e.g., cash bonus plan, profit sharing plans) but have no rights to 
decide on the allocation. In cash profit sharing, employees receive money depending on overall company 
performance in addition to their wages; they share in the returns, but do not have ownership. Alternatively, stock 
profit sharing (or employee share ownership) plans give employees profit-sharing bonuses in the form of company 
shares, which does constitute ownership (Perotin and Robinson 2002).
	
Hansmann makes an important distinction between formal control and effective control. In many organizations, 
such as publicly traded corporations and large cooperatives, the firm’s owners (the shareholders or the members) 
elect a board of directors and participate directly only in a limited set of fundamental decisions such as 
acquisitions, mergers, and dissolution of the firm. In these situations, managers have a great deal of decision 
making autonomy. Another important distinction relevant to employee ownership is the difference between 
control and participation; participation does not necessarily equate with control. For example, employees may 
have opportunities to provide input to management, but their opinions may not be reflected in final decisions 
(Levine and Tyson 1990). By Hansmann’s definition, employee ownership requires that workers have formal 
rights to control, for example, voting rights or employee representation on company boards of directors.
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the United States.13,14 The Iowa-Nebraska Chapter of The ESOP Association reports 
approximately 200 ESOP firms in these two states. ESOPs are typically structured as deferred 
compensation plans in which the employer deposits stock in a trust fund that holds the stock for 
the benefit of the participating employees, often as the reserve for the employees’ pensions 
(Hansmann 2000). In a typical ESOP firm, employees may not have formal control rights since 
they cannot appoint the trustees of the ESOP trust (Hansmann 2000; Padgham 2002; Dickstein 
1991). Stock in the ESOP firm is owned by the ESOP trust, and as such, the voting rights rest 
with the trust, rather than the employees. In fact, Pitegoff (2004, 245) argues, “Much of the 
activity in the world of employee ownership … has little to do with worker control of the 
enterprise and involves little or no employee influence in corporate decision-making.” 
However, some ESOP firms are more democratic, allowing employees to elect the ESOP 
trustee(s) and vote through the trustees. According to the ESOP Association,15 the number of 
majority-owned ESOP firms is roughly 4,500, while 100% owned ESOP firms number 3,000. As 
noted above, these firms are primarily a phenomenon of small and medium-sized independently 
owned businesses. Firms that are 100% ESOP-owned (the ESOP owns 100% of the shares) are 
similar to worker cooperatives since employees hold all the stock, and therefore, all the voting 
power on the board of directors. In contrast to a worker cooperative, however, voting power in 
an ESOP firm is not necessarily based on one person, one vote (see table 4). 
  
 
13
 The National Center for Employee Ownership reports the number of ESOPs, stock bonus plans, and profit sharing 
plans primarily invested in employer stock is approximately 10,500 (The National Center for Employee 
Ownership, www.nceo.org/main/article.php/id/2/). 
14
 On average, 53% of the shares in Iowa/Nebraska ESOP firms are held by employees and 16% of the ESOP firms 
are 100% employee-owned firms (The Iowa-Nebraska Chapter of The ESOP Association, www.iane-
esop.org/index.php?section=root&t=chapterFactSheet). 
15
 Refer to the web page at www.esopassociation.org/media/media_statistics.asp. 
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Table 4. Comparison between worker cooperative and ESOP firm. 
 Worker Cooperative Employee Stock Ownership Plan 
Ownership structure One share per person of 
common stock. Can also have 
preferred stock (voting rights 
are limited). 
Very flexible. Predetermined formula 
ranging from equal distribution to a 
complex formula based on salary, 
years of service, and hours worked. 
Can be full or partial ownership. 
Voting rights One person, one vote. One person, one vote or one share, 
one vote. One share, one vote on 
supermajority issues. 
Allocation of profits Based on hours worked or 
wages earned. May take into 
account other factors, such as 
seniority. 
Based on shares held. 
Source: Northcountry Cooperative Development Fund (2006, 18). 
 
V. Literature Review 
 
As employee ownership has grown in the United States, so has the literature evaluating the 
performance of employee-owned firms relative to firms without employee ownership. Much of 
the academic research on this topic has analyzed ESOPs, and in particular, public company 
ESOPs. This is due both to ESOPs’ relative prevalence in the U.S. economy and data 
availability. The main focus of many of these studies has been the effect of employee ownership 
on firm profitability, and to a lesser extent, firm survival and longevity. 
Few studies have examined worker cooperatives in the United States; the main empirical studies 
have evaluated a set of plywood cooperatives operating in the Pacific Northwest. More research 
has examined outcomes for worker cooperatives in Europe, notably, France, Italy and Spain, as 
well as Latin America. Undoubtedly the most well-known example of successful worker 
cooperation is the highly unique experience of the Mondragon cooperatives in the Basque region 
of Spain. A number of papers analyze the origins, growth, and performance of these 
cooperatives. 
Empirical analysis of the impacts of employee ownership is plagued by lack of data, especially 
data on firms with the type of majority employee ownership and dominant employee control 
characterized by worker cooperatives. Many studies lack longitudinal data and good comparisons 
with conventional firms (Dickstein 1991). Methodological shortcomings of existing studies limit 
the extent to which the findings can be generalized to other settings (Bonin, Jones, and 
Putterman 1993). 
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This section reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on employee-ownership focusing 
when possible on assessments of the performance of worker cooperatives. 
A. Impacts on firms 
Productivity and Performance. A large portion of the literature on employee ownership, and the 
more specific form, worker cooperatives, focuses on analyzing the impacts of ownership 
structure on firm productivity and performance. Studies have examined firm-level productivity 
effects of both key dimensions of employee ownership – return and control rights, individually 
and in combination. 
Giving employees an ownership stake in the success of the firm through profit sharing, ESOPs, 
or more directly as seen in worker cooperatives does in general seem to improve, or at least not 
reduce, firm productivity relative to comparable firms without employee ownership. Having 
rights to the returns of the firm provides employees an incentive to increase their efforts to 
enhance performance of the firm since part of their pay will depend on the profits of the firm. 
Profit sharing may lead to heighted morale or company spirit, which motivates employees to 
produce more and better work. It can improve the flow of information in the firm, leading to 
better production methods and it can lower employee turnover, facilitating accumulation of firm 
specific knowledge and skills, which in turn enhance firm performance (Bonin, Jones, and 
Putterman 1993; Park, Kruse, and Sesil 2004). 
However, the size of employees’ stake matters, however. Russell (1988, 384) argues that in 
many cases “…profit sharing and employee stock ownership create too small and diluted an 
incentive to give employees a meaningful material stake in the profitability of their firm.” The 
greater the employee share of ownership, the bigger the effect on motivation and performance, 
and therefore the greater the impact on firm productivity (Ben-Ner and Jones 1995; Pendleton 
and Robinson 2010). The size of the stake refers both to proportion of ownership (e.g., stock) 
held by employees as well as to any individual employee’s share. Kruse and Blasi (1995) report 
that, in a sample of cooperatives, the percent of employees who are members in the cooperative, 
individual capital stakes per worker, and the size of employee bonus (or patronage refund) were 
all strongly correlated with increased firm productivity. 
Some theorists have cautioned that when the incentive plan is such that the reward to any 
individual employee depends on the performance of the group, a free rider problem can emerge. 
Under performance pay programs, if an employee’s incentive pay depends solely on his or her 
effort, the incentive is clear: he works harder (or smarter) and he earns more. But when the 
performance pay depends on a group’s productivity, incentives are diluted. Furthermore, the 
larger the group, the weaker the incentive (Kruse 2002). 
Consider an example of a salesperson who earns a bonus of $100 for every new customer she 
acquires for her company. Here the incentive is direct; she recruits a new customer, she receives 
$100. But recruiting new customers requires extra effort on her part, to identify prospective 
customers, to convince them of the value of the company’s products or services, and to cultivate 
a new relationship. Furthermore, it often involves cold-calling, which many people find 
extremely uncomfortable. Yet as long as the salesperson perceives that the $100 bonus is worth 
the additional effort, she will strive to earn new customer business. 
Now suppose she is part of a sales team with 10 members. In this case, for each new customer 
the team recruits, the team receives $100 which is divided equally among team members. For 
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each new customer she recruits in the team setting, her bonus is now only $10. Clearly her 
incentive is reduced, in large part because the reward she receives does not justify the additional 
work she must do to bring in new customers. 
If the team bonus was $1,000, so each individual received $100 for each new customer recruited 
by the team and if she felt the $100 bonus justified the extra work, she might try harder to find 
new customers. Or, she might realize that as long as the other team members were finding and 
recruiting new customers, she could still receive a bonus without any additional effort, 
effectively “free riding” on the efforts of co-workers. 
The free riding result rests on fairly strong assumptions about the inability of co-workers to 
observe one another’s efforts. In reality, one likely can tell how much effort co-workers are 
putting forth (although imperfectly), so some amount of “horizontal monitoring” or informal 
policing through peer pressure is possible and effective at preventing free riding. Shirking has 
not been reported as a concern in empirical studies of worker cooperatives. Furthermore, there 
are other factors at play in group settings with profit sharing, notably a spirit of cooperative 
problem solving, higher work norms, and heightened morale stemming from a sense of 
ownership in the firm (Bonin, Jones, and Putterman 1993; Kruse 2002). 
By itself, worker participation in decision making can promote greater commitment and 
motivation from workers. The idea is that workers who have greater authority to make decisions 
about how they do their work, the type of work they do, and the products they develop will work 
more effectively and will be more invested in the fate of their employer (Smith 2006). Worker 
participation can improve information flow between front line workers and upper level 
management. It can also bring diverse perspectives and generate more ideas, particularly from 
those employees closest to the production process, the shop floor (Appelbaum and Berg 2000). 
Greater control over working conditions may be increasingly important in the context of rising 
education levels – more highly educated workers may desire greater responsibility in their work 
and greater challenges. 
 
Just as the level of financial stake held by employees appears to impact the magnitude of 
productivity effects at the firm level, so may the level of employee participation in decision 
making. The empirical evidence on the success of worker participation programs varies widely 
depending on the context in which the programs are implemented (Conyon and Freeman 2004; 
Smith 2006). On one hand, there must be enough opportunity for decision making to be 
meaningful. Workers must perceive that participation programs do give them some authority to 
make changes and decisions if they are to enhance worker motivation and performance (Ben-Ner 
and Jones 1995). 
 
On the other hand, some authors caution against “too much participation.” Employee 
involvement in decision making, introduces inexperienced or unqualified personnel to decision 
making, slowing the decision process and potentially resulting in poor decisions. It may bring an 
excessive focus on grievances and complaints which can reduce morale (Pendleton and Robinson 
2010). 
 
Collective decision making can make it more difficult to reconcile employee differences. For 
example, in a worker cooperative younger members may prefer to allocate profits in the form of 
higher wages, while older members may prefer increasing returns to capital or accelerating 
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payments on loans (Hansmann 2000). Furthermore, the more time spent in meetings and on 
governance issues, the less time spent on the “productive work” of the business. In the long-run, 
Hansmann (2000) contends that conflicts of interest and inefficiency of collective decision-
making can prevent quick responses to rapid changes in market conditions, leaving worker 
cooperatives at a marked disadvantage to conventional firms where decision making is more 
concentrated. 
 
Meyers (2006) argues, that while democratic processes in the work place are time consuming, 
they are perhaps not any more so than in non-democratic workplaces. She notes that managers 
spend a great deal of time on issues of employee retention, discipline, grievances, etc. She also 
contends that allowing members to choose which tasks they perform provides a sorting 
mechanism in which workers will gravitate toward those tasks more closely aligned with their 
skills and interests, or provide opportunities to take on new tasks and learn new skills. In her case 
study work, she observed this having an added effect of reducing “the number of responsibilities 
seen as undesirable” (p. 215). 
 
Hansmann (2000) suggests that conflicts in decision making can be mitigated when jobs are 
similar overall and the number of workers is small in worker cooperatives. In these cases, 
workers’ interests are roughly similar and conflicts of interest are less common. 
 
Several authors contend that combining employee ownership or profit sharing with decision 
making rights is critical for determining the magnitude of impacts on firm productivity. If 
employee participation is not combined with some share in the firm’s profits, they may focus 
more on improving their working conditions than on decisions that improve organizational 
performance, and therefore, profitability of the firm (Ben-Ner and Jones 1995; Bonin, Jones, and 
Putterman 1993). Financial rewards, being more tangible, may improve or ensure employee 
participation (Kato and Morishima 2002). Management in a firm in which employees have return 
rights can have more interest in developing and protecting the human capital of the employees, 
which can have a positive effect on productivity even if few employees participate in decision 
making (Robinson and Zhang 2005). 
Existing empirical evidence provides somewhat mixed results regarding the effects of worker 
ownership and decision making rights on firm productivity. Research focused on worker 
cooperatives tends to find positive productivity effects. For example, Bartlett et al. (1992) 
compared the performance of worker cooperatives to private firms using a set of Italian worker 
cooperatives in light manufacturing matched with similarly sized private firms in the same 
region and sector. They reported higher value-added per worker in the cooperatives relative to 
the private firm, indicating that the worker cooperatives were more productive. Craig et al. (1995) 
showed that worker cooperatives in the U.S. plywood industry are 6-14% more efficient than 
conventional mills in terms of output, holding input constant. Doucouliagos (1995) found that 
labor-managed firms, which are similar to worker cooperatives, have stronger positive 
correlation with productivity than firms where workers only participate in control. 
Studies analyzing worker ownership and control in ESOPs tend to report more variation in firm 
productivity impacts than do studies focused on worker cooperatives. This is perhaps due to 
greater variability in the extent of both employee ownership and participation in decision making 
in these firms relative to worker cooperatives. 
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Kato and Morishima (2002) showed that Japanese firms with highly participatory human 
resource management practices (HRMPs) enjoyed productivity gains of 8% to 9% over firms 
with no HRMPs. The positive effect occurs only when both financial participation (ESOPs) and 
employee involvement (joint labor management councils and shop floor committees) exist and 
when employee involvement/participation exists at both the top and grassroots levels of the firm. 
For firms with an intermediate level of HRMPs (only financial or participation but not both, or 
participation only at one level of the firm), they found no significant positive effect on 
productivity. In fact, they reported a productivity loss after four years, but this negative impact 
dissipated over time. In contrast, Conyon and Freeman (2004) found positive productivity effects 
for some forms of shared compensation in British firms, and showed that shared compensation 
plans are more likely to have communication and information sharing systems in place. They did 
not find an added effect of communication above the positive effect of the shared compensation 
plan. 
The magnitude of the positive productivity impact rises with the level of membership in the 
ESOP for a given level of employee participation in decision making (Jones and Kato 1993; 
Pendleton and Robinson 2004). At the same time, there is some evidence that increased 
employee participation in company decision making lowers firm productivity in British and 
Japanese ESOP firms. The authors of these studies interpret this result as consistent with 
assertions that the presence of an ESOP, by virtue of its voting power on the board of directors, 
can reduce executives’ authority and power, hinder managerial decision making, and dilute 
managerial incentives, which in turn, harms firm performance (Jones and Kato 1993; Pendleton 
and Robinson 2004). 
There may be additional factors that explain the difference between the productivity effects of 
worker ownership between cooperatives (or labor managed firms) and ESOPs. Self-selection 
might be present. That is, employees who choose to work in a cooperative may have different 
attitudes or abilities relative to those who choose to work in conventional firms (Williamson 
1973).16 The organizational culture may be different. There might be differences in hierarchical 
organization and in the relationship between employees and management (Bonin, Jones, and 
Putterman 1993). The timing at which employee ownership and participation is implemented 
may also contribute to observed differences. There may be different “learning curves” for firms 
that are employee-owned from inception and those that adopt it at some point in their history. 
Kato and Morishima (2002) find there is a substantial time lag in the productivity payoff of 
ESOPs (they estimate seven years) in Japanese firms. 
Longevity and survival: Another performance outcome analyzed in the theoretical and empirical 
literature is the rate of firm survival and longevity. Some authors have hypothesized that worker 
cooperatives will be shorter-lived than conventional firms. Vanek (1977) claims that dependence 
on internal financing from profit leads to under-investment. Members have an incentive not to 
 
16
 Williamson (1973, 317) writes, “Modes of organization or practices which would have superior productivity 
consequences if implemented within, and thus would be adopted by, a group of expected pecuniary gain 
maximizers may be modified or rejected by groups with different values. For one thing, favorable productivity 
consequences may no longer obtain. In addition, preferences for atmosphere may induce individuals to forego 
material gains for nonpecuniary satisfactions if the modes of practices are regarded as oppressive or otherwise 
repugnant. This does not lead to a uniform preference for one mode of organization over another, however…” 
Individuals should be allowed to sort into organizational forms according to their preferences.” 
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re-invest the profit in the cooperative, but rather to claim higher wages. This ultimately leads to 
failure. Ben-Ner (1984) argues that worker cooperatives will tend to degenerate into 
conventional firms because of a tendency to replace retired member workers with non-member 
workers in order to increase the remaining member workers’ compensation. Another 
degeneration theory suggests that successful worker cooperatives will tend to convert to investor-
owned firms over time. Business success increases the net worth of the firm making it subject to 
takeover attempts and the temptation for worker-owners to sell in order to “cash out” their 
investment in the cooperative. Higher individual capital stakes also make it more difficult for 
potential new worker-members to buy out retiring or exiting members. 
Empirical research does not lend much support to the degeneration hypotheses. Estrin and Jones 
(1992) report that more than 30% of worker cooperatives across a variety of industries were 
more than 30 years old in France in 1979, demonstrating that many worker cooperatives can 
survive for long periods of time. They found no evidence that worker cooperatives are less 
productive, less profitable, or less capital-intensive than conventional firms, and showed that the 
exit rate of worker cooperatives between 1970 and 1979 was not significantly different from 
private firms. Perotin (2006) indicates that the creation of worker cooperatives has been higher 
than French firms in general, and the exit rate of worker cooperatives has been the same or 
slightly lower, using data for the years 1979-1998.17 Burdin and Dean (2009) tested the 
degeneration hypothesis in their data for Uruguayan worker cooperatives by examining the 
relationship between the ratio of non-member to member workers and output price. They found 
no positive relationship between these two measures. 
Park, Kruse, and Sesil (2004) suggest a number of reasons why employee-owned firms might 
survive longer than their conventional counterparts. Employment stability (lower quit rates and 
fewer layoffs) can facilitate increased investment in firm-specific training, which improves firm 
performance. Robinson and Zhang (2005) echo this notion, adding that employee ownership 
helps protect investments in firm-specific knowledge and skills for both the firm and the 
employees. In fact, they argue that employee ownership can be a competitive advantage, “ESO 
(employee stock ownership) enables firms to build and sustain their competitive advantage by 
rewarding and protecting employees, who, along with shareholders, make valuable investments” 
(2005, 484). To the extent that employee ownership improves firm performance and 
productivity, employee ownership may reduce the chances of bankruptcy or liquidation. 
Employee ownership may increase employee commitment to the firm, making employees more 
resistant to mergers and acquisitions. Their empirical analysis used Weibull survival models to 
analyze firm survival in a set of U.S. public companies from 1988 through 2001. They report that 
companies with employee ownership stakes of 5% or more were only 76% as likely to disappear 
(merge, be acquired, or fail) compared with all public companies and with a control group of 
similar firms. For 100% employee-owned firms, the relative rate of failure falls to 33.5%. 
Furthermore, their analysis finds that the difference in survival rates is not explained by 
increased productivity, financial strength, or compensation flexibility, but rather linked to greater 
employee stability in employee-owned firms. 
Product Quality: A less examined issue is the effect of employee-ownership on product and 
service quality. Case studies report that provision of higher quality goods and services are a 
 
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 The increase in the number of worker cooperatives is small since the initial population is small. 
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motivating factor for formation of some worker cooperatives. Improved information sharing 
characteristic of worker cooperatives and employee-owned firms can directly impact product 
quality. Horowitz and Horowitz (1999) present a theoretical model that compares quality and 
quantity choice in labor-managed and profit-oriented firms. Their analysis reached no firm 
conclusions, but rather implied that the outcomes for quality provision vary by which workers (in 
their model either production workers or quality–enhancing workers) comprise the membership 
of the cooperative, as well as whether quality and quantity are substitutes or complements in firm 
production. 
B. Impacts on employees 
Pay and benefits: A common argument made to explain the rarity of worker cooperatives is that 
risk averse workers are unwilling to trade fixed salaries for earning a portion of their wages in 
the form of more variable, and thus riskier, profits. The underlying assumption appears to be that 
the expected pay would be the same in either case; that is, workers in employee-owned firms 
sacrifice some wages and other benefits in exchange for a share of ownership. Yet, comparisons 
of pay levels in employee-owned and conventional firms find that company stock (earned 
through the ESOP) is provided in addition to, rather than in place of, other forms of employee 
compensation (Kruse 2002; Kruse, Freeman, and Blasi 2010). For example, Blasi et al. (1996) 
document 8% higher average compensation levels in public companies with broad-based 
employee ownership plans (at least 5% of stock) compared with similar public companies. This 
study also found that relative compensation levels increased as the percent of stock held by 
employees rises.  
Case evidence of successful worker cooperatives often report higher pay and benefits relative to 
conventional firms in the same industry. For example, Hochner et al. (1988) describe a worker 
cooperative grocery in Philadelphia that maintained higher levels of full-time jobs at higher 
wages than competitors without decreasing profits. Similarly, Meyer (2006) reports average 
compensation for employees of a worker-owned grocery in the San Francisco Bay area was 40% 
more than the average for unionized grocery workers in California. In addition, the cooperative 
provided healthcare coverage for all members averaging at least 24 hours per week, a benefit 
typically not given to part-time retail workers.  
Financial Risk: Another potential downside of employee ownership is increased financial risk 
for employees. Compensation of employees can be more variable when part of it depends on 
firm profits (Hansmann 2000). Furthermore, with stock ownership or stock purchase plans, 
employees bear greater risk should the firm fail, as now both their salary (and their human 
capital) and their savings (or retirement plans) are tied up in the same firm (Ben-Ner et al. 2000). 
Speaking to this point, Kruse (2002) argues that employees need to be educated about the 
financial risk of having a large proportion of their retirement savings in employee stock, but 
likens the risk of employee ownership of employer stock to owning a farm or small business. 
Bonin Jones and Putterman (1993, 1309) contend that the risk of committing personal wealth 
may be the cost employee-members bear to acquire decision making rights. 
Job security: Worker cooperatives may offer greater job security relative to conventional firms. 
Research finds that worker cooperatives are more likely to adjust wages rather than employment 
levels compared to conventional firms since member workers can participate in decision-making 
about management.  
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Member-workers may be compensated for temporary wage cuts today by their claim on future 
profits. Empirical results have supported this argument. Craig and Pencavel (1992) indicate that 
worker cooperatives in the Pacific Northwest plywood industry were more likely to change wage 
levels than employment levels compared to other types of mills (non-unionized mills and 
unionized mills) using data for the years 1968-1986. In a subsequent paper, the same authors 
conclude that earnings, hours and employment are all important factors for cooperatives, but 
employment considerations tend to outweigh earnings.Burdin and Dean (2009) found that 
worker cooperatives in Uruguay were more willing to raise wages when output prices increased, 
and the wage increase was larger than that in conventional firms for the years 1996-2005. While 
employment levels tend to rise with output price in both conventional firms and worker 
cooperatives, the effect is statistically significant only in the conventional firms. The authors 
concluded that demand for labor in worker cooperatives is more inelastic than in conventional 
firms; that is, worker cooperatives tend to adjust wages more than employment levels. Pencavel, 
Pistaferri, and Schivardi (2006) show similar results using data on Italian firms for the years 
1982-1994. 
Case study evidence also supports this idea. In a case study of a worker-owned recreational 
equipment manufacturer in the United States, Schoening (2006, 303) reports that the sentiments 
expressed by interviewed members suggest they were not comfortable hiring a new employee 
unless they could ensure stable employment. Worried about the consequences of layoffs on the 
affected employees and their families, one member described a preference for everyone 
accepting lower wages over layoffs, “…we all move down a little bit. It’s like everyone is 
affected a little.” Schoening provides the following interpretation, “The reason for being in 
business as a cooperative is to protect co-members, and to attempt to distribute both burdens and 
rewards equally.” 
Bartlett et al. (1992) found cooperatives had lower quit rates, relative to similar conventional 
firms, but only among member-workers. When non-member workers of the cooperatives were 
compared with employees of conventional firms, no significant differences in quit rates were 
found. Lower quit rates facilitate skill accumulation and learning, which can improve firm 
productivity and profitability, translating to higher earnings for worker cooperative members. 
Worker cooperatives may mitigate unemployment in recessions. Perotin (2006) found that 
worker cooperatives were likely to be created more counter-cyclically than conventional firms, 
using data on French firms for the years 1979-1998. She also found that the formation of worker 
cooperatives is more positively associated with risks related to unemployment than expected 
profits. This result is supported by research on worker cooperatives in Israel and the United 
States (Russell and Hanneman 1992; Russell 1995; Conte and Jones 1991). 
Job quality and satisfaction: Worker cooperatives may improve job quality relative to 
conventional firms. In worker cooperatives, workers can have discretion to adjust daily work 
flow and change working circumstances, such as the layout of machines (Cornforth et al. 1988). 
As noted above, they may have discretion in choosing which tasks they perform, which can have 
the effect of minimizing the number of tasks viewed as undesirable (Meyers 2006). They may 
even have some say in choosing their colleagues. 
In general, employee ownership can enhance job satisfaction and employee motivation which 
benefits both the individual employees and the firm through enhanced productivity. In a number 
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of studies, greater satisfaction has been reported among employee-owners who perceived 
increased influence or participation in workplace decisions (Kruse and Blasi 1995). The positive 
effect of employee ownership on job satisfaction might stem from increased training, freedom 
from supervision, and job security (Kruse et al. 2010). This may be especially important in the 
services industry where employees’ direct stake in business success can improve job satisfaction, 
and therefore, the quality of service (Pitgoff 2004). Trevor (2007) cautions that improved job 
satisfaction may hinge on person-organization fit; that is, those workers who find employee-
owned or worker cooperative work environments to be a good fit for their skills and personalities 
are more likely to report greater job satisfaction and commitment. 
The flip side to these arguments is that greater employee participation in decision making may 
reduce job quality and satisfaction. One reason is that it can greatly increase the workload of 
individual employee-members since collective decision making involves additional time and 
responsibilities. Some employees may dislike the responsibilities associated with participation, 
viewing it as a burden rather than a positive benefit of ownership (Dickstein 1991). In the case of 
one worker-owned grocery, employee-members view participation as part of their regular work. 
This policy is explicit; members are paid the same wage to attend meetings as they receive for 
their other (revenue-generating) work (Meyers 2006). 
As the number of supervisors or managers is reduced and reliance on horizontal or peer 
monitoring increases, there is the potential for excessive peer pressure in worker cooperatives 
that can increase interpersonal frictions (Eccles 1981; Whyte 1986). If the peer monitoring is 
excessive, it can increase worker stress levels, which in turn decreases productivity and job 
satisfaction. 
Skill accumulation and training: Worker cooperatives can facilitate increased accumulation of 
skills and on-the-job training for employees. A basic cooperative principle is to provide training 
and education to members, managers, and employees to help them contribute more effectively to 
the development of the cooperative (Northcountry Cooperative Foundation 2006). Participatory 
work environments require employees to learn interpersonal and decision-making skills in order 
to carry out their jobs effectively (Appelbaum and Berg 2000). These skills can have value to 
employees outside of their work environment as well. Job stability in employee-owned firms and 
cooperatives increases workers’ incentives to invest time and money in additional training that 
will benefit the firm as well as themselves. Having a say in company decisions and a stake in the 
profits helps insure that both employees and the firm are committed to a long-term relationship 
(Robinson and Zhang 2005). 
C. Impacts on communities 
Vehicle for community economic development: Worker cooperatives can contribute to 
community economic development, which includes creating stable and quality jobs, driving 
change in distressed regions and economic sectors, and personal enhancement. Community 
economic development is characterized by an explicit agenda “for broader benefit and 
accountability and for building local resources, capacity, and power among low and moderate-
income constituencies” (Pitegoff 2004). Because worker cooperatives are controlled by the 
workers rather than an outside corporation or absentee-owner, these firms are more likely to stay 
where the workers live and retain jobs in the community (Dickstein, 1991). A comparison of 
worker cooperatives with similar conventional firms in Italy found that cooperatives more 
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readily hired workers who had suffered long periods of unemployment (Bartlett et al. 1992). This 
pattern, the authors suggest, “…may reflect the nature of the cooperatives’ link with the local 
community, and indicate a willingness to exert positive discrimination in favor of workers 
disadvantaged in the local labor market” (1992, 115). Evergreen Cooperatives (ECs) in 
Cleveland, Ohio are examples of worker cooperatives formed, in part, to achieve community 
economic development goals (Alperovitz, Howard, and Dubb 2009). 
VI. Why are worker cooperatives so rare? 
Worker cooperatives are rare in the United States. Only about 200 U.S. worker cooperatives 
were identified for this project,18 putting the ratio of worker cooperatives to total firms at 
approximately 0.004% in 2007, and the ratio to all cooperatives at 0.48%. The rarity is somewhat 
puzzling. Worker cooperatives have many potential benefits and under certain conditions the 
possible challenges raised in the literature can seemingly be mitigated. Firms with ESOPs are 
considerably more common than worker cooperatives, although ESOP firms, particularly 
democratic ESOPs, have a similar structure to worker cooperatives. We can divide explanations 
for the rarity of worker cooperatives into two main camps: 1) worker cooperatives may fail at a 
higher rate than other types of firms and 2) barriers to start-up may prevent firms from forming 
as worker cooperatives in the first place. 
A. Worker cooperatives may fail at higher rates: Explanations for higher failure rates of 
worker cooperatives include degeneration hypotheses, internal incentive problems, and external 
environmental factors. 
Degeneration hypotheses: As described above, some authors have hypothesized that worker 
cooperatives will be shorter-lived than conventional firms. One argument is that dependence on 
internal financing from profits leads to under-investment because members have an incentive to 
claim higher wages rather than re-invest in the cooperative (Vanek 1977). Another explanation 
reasons that worker cooperatives will degenerate into conventional firms because of a tendency 
to replace retired member workers with non-member workers in order to increase the remaining 
member workers’ compensation (Ben-Ner 1984). A third hypothesis is that success ultimately 
leads to “failure” or conversion of worker cooperatives to investor-owned firms. A cooperative’s 
success increases the net worth of the firm, raising the temptation for worker-owners to sell in 
order to “cash out” their investment in the cooperative. Higher individual capital stakes also 
make it more difficult for potential new worker-members to buy out retiring or exiting members. 
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A handful of organizations have compiled lists of worker cooperatives in the United States. 
Source Number of worker cooperatives  Note 
U.S. Federation of Worker Cooperatives 
(2008) 
210 Includes collectives and democratic 
workplaces as well as worker 
cooperatives 
Deller et al. (2009) 223 No list of worker cooperatives 
National Cooperative Grocers 
Association, www.go.coop 
303 Contains related organizations such 
as cooperative developers 

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External Environmental Factors: A second set of explanations for increased failure of worker 
cooperatives implicates unfavorable conditions in the economic and institutional environment in 
which the cooperative exists. 
Worker cooperatives may have difficulty obtaining external financing (Dickstein 1991). Debt 
financing can be problematic because investors think worker cooperatives have high risk, 
perhaps due to a general lack of familiarity with the structure of worker cooperatives. They may 
not know how to evaluate the risk and profitability of worker cooperatives. Obtaining external 
equity financing may also be difficult. Traditional cooperative statutes prohibit non-member 
investment in cooperatives and limit the amount of return on equity, favoring returns based on 
use (USDA 1997). In cases where outside investors are allowed to purchase equity, the problem
remains that the external investors may not have a safeguard to guarantee a certain level of return. 
Elster (1989, 103) notes “Why would outside investors be attracted to a firm over which they 
have no control? For all they know, the cooperative might pay zero dividends year after year.” In 
other words, it is possible that workers would increase their wages to decrease the profits and 
dividends to outside investors. Elster continues, “A counterargument is that the cooperative 
would be kept in line by the knowledge that it may need to attract capital in the future. Unless 
present shareholders are paid satisfactory dividends, future investors will not be forthcoming. 
Knowing this, present investors will not be deterred by the fact that the cooperative is formally 
free to reduce dividends to zero.” More recently, limited cooperative associations, like Iowa 
501A cooperatives, have emerged in response to this problem of access to external financing. 
The cooperative statute contains provisions that allow for some degree of investor voting rights 
and participation on boards of directors. These statutes also remove the limits on investor returns. 
Some government programs have been established to help address this issue as well. Worker 
cooperatives can take advantage of the Business and Industry (B&I) Guaranteed Loan Program 
from USDA Rural Development. The B&I loan guarantee decreases a bank’s risk to only 20% of 
the loan principal in the case of default on loans of $5 million or less (Reynolds 2009). 
Problems of obtaining external financing are mitigated when large amounts of firm-specific 
capital is not required (Hansmann 2000). For example, cars in a taxi worker cooperative can be 
easily sold; they are not firm-specific. Assets that can be readily sold in a secondary market have 
more collateral value and concerns of external financers may be decreased (Ben-Ner et al. 2000).  
Elster (1989, 97) presents a more pessimistic view, suggesting that worker cooperatives may face 
a form of discrimination on the part of banks and suppliers, “If a supplier believes that the bank 
will discriminate against the cooperative, he will accept only cash on delivery. If the bank 
believes that suppliers discriminate, it will offer credit on less favorable terms. What a firm may 
not do out of ill-will, it may do out of (possibly unfounded) suspicion of the ill-will of others.” In 
support of his argument Elster cites the historical example described by John Stuart Mill, in 
which a cooperative lock-making firm was the victim of collusive underselling and other 
discriminatory practices by its capitalist rivals. 
Internal Incentive Problems: A final group of explanations focuses on problems related to 
internal incentives in the cooperative. Some purported reasons for cooperative failure point to 
lack of internal incentives to provide financing or make long-term investments. Others blame 
misaligned incentives for managers and workers to contribute effectively to the productivity of 
the organization. 
  	
Given a lack of external financing, worker cooperatives are forced to rely on internal funds to 
finance growth. However, it may be difficult to raise funding through member loans in a worker 
cooperative (Dickstein 1991; Bowles and Gintis 1996). Members may not possess substantial 
amounts of savings. In addition, lending money to the cooperative increases their risk since they 
lose the opportunity to moderate income fluctuations by investing in other assets. Their 
additional investments in the cooperative are exposed to the same pattern of risk as their wages. 
Bonin, Jones, and Putterman (1993, 1309) suggest that the “risk of committing personal wealth 
may be the cost employee-members bear to acquire decision making rights.” Furthermore, it is 
not clear why a worker-member who invests in his/her cooperative is different from a small 
business owner who invests savings in a firm and derives living expenses from its earnings. 
The problem of internal financing may not be too severe in firms and industries with low capital 
requirements (Hansmann 2000). For example, worker cooperatives are being created in labor-
intensive industries such as home care and housecleaning services. 
Another finance-related explanation for failure of worker cooperatives is known as the horizon 
problem (Dow 2003). Worker cooperatives can suffer from underinvestment because ownership 
is not transferrable in a capital market; in other words, workers typically cannot sell their share 
of the cooperative. Consider a case in which the cost of a long-term investment is upfront or 
immediate, while the payoff to the investment occurs only gradually or relatively far into the 
future. Members looking to leave or retire from the cooperative in the near future, would not 
realize the returns from the long-term investment. They would potentially not vote to approve the 
project investment, preferring to increase their benefits today. An example given in the literature 
is machinery maintenance. If some members plan to leave in the near future, they would have an 
incentive to maintain the machinery with minimal repair or replacement costs. 
The horizon problem is lowered when the tenure of workers is long (Hansmann 2000). As noted 
above, member-employees in worker cooperatives have lower quit rates and generally longer 
tenure relative to conventional firms. In addition, worker cooperative culture tends to place 
significant value on the future generation of workers (Corcoran and Wilson 2010). As a result, 
disagreements over long-term investments may not be severe. However, Cheney (2006) suggests 
the culture may be changing based on his study of the Mondragon cooperatives in Spain. 
Cooperatives may be more likely to fail as younger recruits, who have different cultural views 
and values, enter the cooperatives. A danger arises when the value commitments of the founding 
generation are come to be seen as outdated by younger recruits. Cheney reports there is evidence 
such a shift is beginning to occur at Mondragon. Younger worker-members have more 
individualistic conceptions of career, which may pose a threat to the continued existence of this 
cooperative movement. 
A somewhat different line of reasoning for why worker cooperatives might not persist focuses on 
the incentives and abilities of the employees. Member-workers in the cooperative may lack 
managerial skills, which can lead to inefficient management. In principle, each member may be 
eligible to serve as a manager or on the board of directors. These positions require sufficient 
knowledge of management and finance and an understanding of the firm’s market situation. A 
completely different set of skills may be needed in these positions relative to the skills required 
for a non-managerial position in the cooperative. Members may know how to make products, but 
not how to craft an appropriate business strategy to survive in a changing market. A lack of 
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managerial skill among cooperative members can result in inappropriate responses to market 
change (Hansmann 2000). 
Many worker cooperatives hire external managers to obtain this type of expertise. However, 
worker cooperatives can also have difficulty attracting managers from the outside (Dickstein 
1991). Often managers require higher wages than the wages earned by members and members 
may not readily accept this wage difference. Most managers are more familiar with hierarchical 
structures than cooperative structures, which can be more “flat.” Managers may need to be 
educated about the operation of the cooperative, which can entail a significant learning curve for 
managers. 
The problems of limited managerial experience of workers and recruiting managers are less 
severe, or even irrelevant when worker cooperatives exist in industries with relatively slow 
changes in technology and market competition. Under these conditions, when the organization 
size is small and the pace of decision making is not fast, workers can obtain managerial skills 
and experience in a learning-by-doing manner. 
B. Barriers to entry prevent worker cooperative formation: As noted above, empirical 
research, although limited in its scope, finds worker cooperatives tend to survive as long or 
longer than their conventional counterparts, providing little or no support for the arguments 
described in the previous section. This section reviews a number of proposed barriers thought to 
explain why worker cooperatives may be less likely to form in the first place. 
Difficulty attracting entrepreneurial talent: Dickstein (1991) cites difficulty in attracting 
entrepreneurial talent as an additional barrier to formation.  She summarizes the theoretical 
arguments made in the existing literature as, “a cooperative simplydoesn’t provide enough 
material reward to attract an entrepreneur” (pg. 25).  She notes that some view entrepreneurship 
as highly individualistic and not readily transferrable to the cooperative model. 
Insufficient rewards for high ability workers: Kremer (1997) presents a theoretical model to 
demonstrate that redistribution among members can distort incentives to work hard. In 
conventional firms, workers’ income is based on their productivity, but in worker cooperatives, 
earnings are often decided by voting. Workers with low ability are likely to agree with 
egalitarian earning schemes, while workers with high ability are not. When workers with low 
ability outnumber workers with high ability, egalitarian earning schemes are chosen by voting. 
This structure will lead higher ability workers to leave the cooperative in favor of greater returns 
to their abilities, or perhaps, prevent them from joining the cooperative in the first place. 
“Workers who believe their ability is greater than the average ability in cooperatives will be 
reluctant to join the cooperative because they will expect the cooperative to redistribute away 
from them.” Of course this line of reasoning assumes that workers value pay above all else. It 
may be the case that workers join cooperatives for other reasons; they may value job stability, 
participatory decision making in the firm, and having a stake in the profits.  
Lack of institutional support: Lack of institutional support may deter formation of worker 
cooperatives in the United States. Worker cooperatives are somewhat more common in Europe, 
where a more extensive institutional structure supportive of cooperative development has grown 
(Dickstein 1991). Only a handful of U.S. states have cooperative statutes specific to worker 
cooperatives. 
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Tax policies and legislative statutes may favor other organizational forms. A notable example is 
the case of employee-buyouts of retiring small-business owners. Owners of a business 
corporation can receive a tax deferral on capital gains from stock sales when they sell their firm 
to employees. The tax benefit from a “1042 rollover,” as this is called, is more easily realized 
through conversion to an ESOP than a worker cooperative (Reynolds 2009). The conversion to a 
worker cooperative must be finished in a much shorter time period than conversion to an ESOP 
under cooperative incorporation statutes. Logue (2006) explains, “ESOPs’ stock structure 
enables owners to sell part of their companies to employees, while retaining enough equity to 
make financing easy. The typical 1042 rollover ESOP is done as a two or three stage transaction 
over a five to 10 year period. By contrast, co-ops are conventionally structured as 100% 
employee-owned. Financing a 100% leveraged transaction is extraordinarily difficult, especially 
if the owners are leaving and taking their management skills with them.” An additional 
advantage is that commercial lenders who make loans to ESOPs are permitted to deduct half the 
interest from their earnings as long as the firm is at least 50% employee owned (Martin 1994). 
However, conversion to an ESOP has been estimated to be more costly. Northcountry 
Cooperative Development Fund (2006) estimates the cost to establish an ESOP ranges from 
$20,000 to $35,000 in addition to an annual maintenance cost between $7,500 and $15,000. 
ESOP firms are regulated by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) which 
requires annual reporting. In contrast, establishment costs for worker cooperatives are typically 
less, estimated to be $5,000 to $20,000, and are not subject to the reporting requirements of 
ERISA. Worker cooperatives also have access to the Business and Industry (B&I) Guaranteed 
Loan Program from USDA Rural Development, which decreases a bank’s risk to 20% of the 
loan principal in the case of default on loans of $5 million or less (Reynolds 2009). 
The short time horizon for converting to a worker cooperative can be extended if the owners 
become members of the newly formed worker cooperative. This approach was taken by Select 
Machine (Logue 2006). Owners qualify for a tax-free rollover as long as at least 30% of the 
owner’s stock is sold to the worker cooperative. The owners’ remaining shares are redeemed by 
the worker cooperative in several steps, which eases the financial burden on the employees 
buying the firm. An additional benefit of this multi-stage cooperative purchase is that the 
employee-members of the worker cooperative can receive management training from the retiring 
owners (Northcountry Cooperative Development Fund 2006; Briton and Stewart 2002). 
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Table 5. Difference between worker cooperatives and ESOP firms in conversion to employee-
owned firms. 
 Worker Cooperative Employee Stock Ownership Plan 
Legal structure Simple, but not familiar to all 
attorneys. Can be organized as 
an LLC or a C corporation if 
articles and bylaws are 
structured appropriately. 
Relatively complex, but familiar to many 
attorneys. 
Costs: 
Set up 
Annual maintenance cost 
 
$5,000-$20,000 
None 
 
$20,000-$35,000 (more if complex) 
$7,500-$15,000 
Bank financing Cooperatives are not well 
understood by banks. Fewer 
options for bank financing. 
Well understood by banks. 
Source: Northcountry Cooperative Development Fund (2006), Worker Cooperative Toolbox, pp.18-19. 
 
Lack of awareness of cooperative form: A last set of explanations contends that worker 
cooperatives do not form, precisely because they are so rare. There is a widespread lack of 
awareness of the worker-owned cooperative as a legitimate option for business organization. 
Perotin (2006) describes the concept of density dependence; the size of the existing population of 
cooperatives affects future development. As the number of labor-managed firms increases, the 
organizational form is seen as more legitimate. Elster (1989) also suggests that the rarity of 
worker cooperatives may be due to interactions with environment rather than intrinsic 
characteristics. He uses the notion of “endogenous preference formation,” in which the presence 
of worker cooperatives is a necessary condition for creating them.  This condition arises in part 
because workers will be more willing to join a cooperative when they are more common and 
because they may affect the culture and desire of workers to live in a more cooperative economy. 
C. A worker cooperative by any other name…: Finally, it may be the case that worker 
cooperatives are not particularly rare, they are just extremely difficult to identify. That is, they 
exist in “non-cooperative” forms. While in theory one can make distinctions between worker 
cooperatives and other forms of employee ownership, in practice these distinctions are very 
blurry. Worker ownership is itself an ambiguous term. As Pitegoff (2004, 244) notes: 
Nominally, it [worker ownership] refers to ownership of a business by those people who 
work in the enterprise. By this definition, many personal, family, and small businesses 
are worker-owned. Some are sole proprietorships, partnerships, or limited liability 
companies, and others are incorporated as business corporations, but few are self-
identified as “worker-owned.” 
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Employee-owned firms might operate like a worker cooperative, but not identify themselves as 
such. Worker cooperatives may be formed as a business corporation, a limited liability company, 
a statutory cooperative, or even a non-profit,19 but structure themselves internally to operate on a 
cooperative basis (Pitegoff 2004).20 
An example from one of the author’s previous research projects illustrates this point. The 
research involved a series of 10 case studies of machinery and labor sharing arrangements among 
Midwestern farmers. One of the cases (Panhandle Farms), describes how six former employees 
of a local grain elevator in western Nebraska formed a farming partnership when they were laid 
off by the regional company that purchased the elevator. The excerpt provided from the case 
study below describes how their farming partnership began: 
When the regional company took over the local elevator, it elected to staff the business 
with its own employees and to drop the local elevator’s farm and land management 
enterprise. Needing to find new employment in an area with few job opportunities, the 
men decided to form a partnership and build a farming operation around the land 
holdings and other clients of the orphaned land management activity. One of the men 
served as the Farm Manager for the local elevator and had gained experience in 
budgeting and working with lenders. Under his leadership, the initial six members of the 
group developed an operating budget for a farming partnership and succeeded in 
obtaining operating credit to start farming under the partnership agreement they had 
developed (Artz, Colson, and Ginder 2007). 
This group operates as an ordinary partnership with equal shares in the business. All members 
provide equal amounts of labor and capital to the enterprise. In addition, the group jointly owns 
about 1,300 acres of land in a separate LLC. Each partner receives an equal portion of net profit 
for personal expenses with the excess amount remaining in the business to retire debt and finance 
growth. They make decisions jointly, meeting on a daily basis to discuss not only the day’s 
activities but also any strategic or longer term management issues that may arise. 
Although not incorporated as a cooperative, this group operates according to cooperative 
principles, with all members participating in management decisions and profit sharing based on 
roughly equal contributions of labor. Panhandle Farms is a good example of collective 
entrepreneurship and demonstrates the potential for employee ownership to save or create rural 
jobs. 
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19
 A number of worker cooperatives identified in this research operate in industries in which non-profit 
organizations are common (e.g., childcare, healthcare, education). Some organizations included in the USFWC 
directory operate as non-profits. Non-profit organization statutes prohibit the distribution of profit; as such, non-
profits do not have owners, and by our definition would not be considered a worker cooperative. However, an 
employee-controlled organization might be regarded as a worker cooperative when the profit is given to workers 
in the form of higher wages or benefits. In certain situations, there may be tax-related or other advantages to 
forming a worker cooperative as a non-profit. 
20
 Pitegoff (2004) notes that in most states this precludes use of the term cooperative in the business name. 
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VII. Feasibility of Worker Cooperatives in Iowa 
While no existing worker cooperatives were identified in Iowa through this research, the 
question remains whether, where, and how future development might occur. As noted in the 
introduction, the worker cooperative form may be well suited for small, rural businesses and the 
institutional and cultural environment for cooperatives is particularly strong in Iowa. 
One approach for determining the types of industries or firms that might be conducive for 
cooperative development is to examine similar, but non-cooperative employee-owned firms in 
Iowa and similar states. Majority- and 100% employee-owned ESOPs share many characteristics 
with worker cooperatives. Most are privately-held small- and medium-sized businesses (Blasi et 
al. 2003). Given the similarities between worker cooperatives and ESOP firms, examining the 
prevalence of ESOPs by industry and location may provide some clues for areas conducive to 
development of worker cooperatives. 
In this section, the relationship between the number of ESOP firms and that of worker 
cooperatives is examined. Note that because we have identified no worker cooperatives in Iowa, 
we use Minnesota and Wisconsin data. Each of these states has more than 10 worker 
cooperatives21 and geographic and industrial properties similar to Iowa. 
The form 5500 with schedule E from the U.S. Department of Labor was used to collect data on 
ESOP firms. Schedule E is attached to form 5500 for ESOP firms. We exclude firms having a 
plan in which the number of active participants is zero, regarding them as firms with inactive 
plans. Table 6 reports 2007 data for Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Iowa.22 Ideally, we would like to 
compare worker cooperatives and majority-owned ESOP firms,23 but we cannot reliably 
determine the percentage of employee ownership based on the data in form 5500. 
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 Seven states have 10 or more worker cooperatives, collectives and democratic workplaces: California, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin (United States Federation of Worker 
Cooperatives 2008). 
		
There are limitations on the data for ESOP firms and worker cooperatives. The ratio of ESOP participation in each 
firm is unknown. It would be preferable to compare ESOP firms with high employee participation rates to worker 
cooperatives. It is expected that their properties, in terms of industry or location, are similar to each other. In 
addition, the exact number of worker cooperatives is unknown. The number of worker cooperatives varies 
somewhat depending on the information source. Those limitations dilute the relationship between ESOP firms and 
worker cooperatives. These limitations need to be considered when interpreting the results.
23
 In a majority ESOP firm, over half of employees participate in the ESOP. 
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Table 6. Number of ESOP firms by state. 
State Year Total 
Plans 
Firms Firms with an inactive 
plan 
Firms with an active plan 
Minnesota 2007 342 297 14 283 
Wisconsin 2007 191 159 0 159 
Iowa 2007 306 224 8 216 
Note: Values are derived from the form 5500 with schedule E from the U.S. Department of Labor, 
www.dol.gov/ebsa/foia/foia-5500.html. 
Worker cooperatives tend to exist in the same industries as ESOP firms in Minnesota and 
Wisconsin with the exception of educational services in Minnesota (see table 7). There are 24 
two-digit industries in the 2002 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). ESOP 
firms in Minnesota are found in 17 industries and 15 industries in Wisconsin. There are eight 
industries which have ESOP firms but no worker cooperatives in Minnesota and Wisconsin: 
finance and insurance, agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, wholesale trade, utilities, 
management of companies and enterprises, other services (except public administration), real 
estate and rental and leasing, and administrative and support and waste management and 
remediation services. This may be because other forms of cooperatives are more appropriate in 
these industries. For example, cooperatives in finance, insurance, and utilities are typically 
consumer cooperatives. Cooperatives in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting are more 
likely to be farmer-owned cooperatives. Nevertheless, the existence of ESOPs in these industries 
raises the question of the suitability of employee-owned cooperatives and points to an area for 
future research. 
Approximately 50% of worker cooperatives are distributed in the top six industries in terms of 
ESOP firms in Minnesota and Wisconsin. In Minnesota, 80.6% of ESOP firms exist in the top 
six industries, and 47.1% of worker cooperatives are distributed in the top six. In Wisconsin, 81% 
of ESOP firms are in the top six industries, and 71.4% of worker cooperatives are in the top six. 
Industries that have more ESOP firms may have more worker cooperatives. Future research 
could check this relationship at a more detailed (three-digit) industry classification level. 
The table also shows the number of ESOPs in Iowa by industry. Based on the comparisons 
between ESOPs and worker cooperatives in Minnesota and Wisconsin, industries such as 
manufacturing to healthcare and social assistance may have favorable conditions for the 
existence of worker cooperatives in Iowa.
  
	
Table 7. Distribution of ESOP firms and worker cooperatives in Minnesota and Wisconsin by industry. 
Industry (two-digit) 
Minnesota   Wisconsin  Iowa 
ESOP 
firm (%) 
Worker 
co-op 
(%) 
ESOP 
firm 
(%) 
Worker 
co-op 
(%) 
 ESOP 
firms 
(%) 
Accommodation and Food Services 0.4 11.8   0.6 0  0.4 
Administrative and Support / Waste Management and 
Remediation Services 0.4 0   0 0 
 
1.3 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 0.4 0 5 0  6.6 
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 0.4 17.6 0 0  0.9 
Construction 7.8 11.8   8.2 0  8.8 
Educational Services 0 5.9   0 0  0 
Finance and Insurance 16.3 0   16.4 0  19.9 
Health Care and Social Assistance 1.4 0   4.4 14.3  7.5 
Information 2.1 17.6 1.3 0  1.8 
Management of Companies and Enterprises 1.8 0   1.9 0  5.3 
Manufacturing 27.9 16 31.4 30  13.7 
Other Services (except Public Administration) 2.1 0   0.6 0  3.5 
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 12.7 4   14.5 10  9.3 
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 1.1 0 0.6 0  5.8 
Retail Trade 10.2 32 6.3 30  8.4 
Transportation and Warehousing 1.1 0 1.3 14.3  1.3 
Utilities 0.7 0 2.5 0  0 
Wholesale Trade 13.4 0   5 0  5.3 
Total 100 100   100 100  100 
Note: Number ESOP firms were obtained from form 5500 with schedule E from the U.S. Department of Labor, www.dol.gov/ebsa/foia/foia-5500.html. Numbers of worker 
cooperatives are from Democracy at Work Directory 2008 by USFWC.24 Two-digit industry classification codes were used following the 2002 North American Industry 
Classification System in the United States Census Bureau (/www.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch?chart=2002).
 
24
 Organizations deemed not to be worker cooperatives, but rather non-profits or other volunteer organizations by checking their web pages were removed from 
the USFWC list (2008). In the end, 17 worker cooperatives in Minnesota and seven in Wisconsin were retained.
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VIII. Discussion and further research and outreach 
Many of the arguments for why worker cooperatives will not succeed or will not form in the first 
place seem to be predicated on a notion that the worker-members who would form or join a 
worker cooperative are relatively uneducated or unskilled. They are “labor,” not management, 
and as such do not have the necessary management skills or experience to run a complex 
business in an ever-changing environment. For example, authors have suggested that allowing 
worker participation introduces inexperienced or ill-qualified participants into decision making 
which results in bad, slowly made decisions.  Others suggest that granting employees ownership 
may give them justification to challenge managers’ decisions or authority (and that this is 
undesirable).  Finally some authors hypothesize that workers will not be motivated to work hard 
or produce quality work unless they are monitored. A century ago this may have been the case, 
but in the current context of generally rising education levels in developed societies and a greater 
recognition of the multi-dimensional nature of human capital, this assumption seems more 
tenuous. All this suggests that the time may be right for development of employee-owned 
cooperatives. 
Some general strategies for promoting worker cooperative development in the United States have 
been offered in the literature. Dickstein (1991) proposes that cooperative development agencies 
“should take a more proactive development approach of targeting specific ventures and sectors 
of the economy where cooperatives have advantages and where systems of cooperatives can 
develop.” She suggests that traditional sectors where worker cooperatives have formed in 
Western Europe, the United States, and Canada – printing, wood and furniture making, 
construction, food processing, services, and crafts – are logical places to start since they have 
relatively low capital requirements, high labor requirements, and the potential for cooperatives to 
achieve high labor productivity. In addition, she proposes social and professional services as 
promising sectors for worker cooperative development. The social services sector, in particular, 
she argues likely attracts a number of people who would be drawn to cooperative principles and 
values. Hough, Wilson, and Corcoran (2010) propose tax credits for investments in worker 
cooperatives similar to programs that have existed in Quebec, Canada. Such a program could be 
akin to a program like that in Missouri, which gave tax credits to residents who invested in 
value-added, producer-owned cooperatives or joint ventures.25 An advantage of these, relative to 
more traditional economic development efforts that give loans, grants, or tax incentives to 
investor-owned firms, is that many people have a stake in the success of the cooperative, making 
the firm less likely to leave the state once the tax incentives have expired. 
Several authors have promoted the idea of increasing educational efforts to inform the general 
public about cooperatives. Luhman (2007) suggests a marketing campaign, and specifically 
proposes financing the making of a documentary, to build awareness of cooperative business 
models. Dickstein (1991) recommends teaching cooperative models in grade schools. There is a 
role for university outreach centers and Extension staff in providing education about the benefits, 
challenges, and risks associated with employee ownership, particularly worker cooperatives. 
Outreach publications outlining business structure alternatives (sole proprietorship, partnership, 
LLC, and so on) could be updated to include information about cooperatives structures. 
 
	
See the Missouri Department of Agriculture website for more information: mda.mo.gov/abd/financial/. 
  

Cooperative developers might benefit from additional case studies and decision tools that help 
them, and the groups they work with, understand and evaluate alternatives for addressing some 
of the challenges associated with organizing as a worker cooperative. For example, how do new 
members build equity in the cooperative and at the same time, what are strategies for retiring 
equity of exiting members? What are the advantages and disadvantages of alternative governance 
structures and how does the size of the cooperative (in terms of number of members) magnify or 
minimize the pros and cons of each? A one or two page bulletin explaining the differences 
between ESOPs and worker cooperatives and outlining various issues to consider in the case of 
employee buyouts could be targeted toward small business owners a few years away from 
retirement. 
Suggestions for future research: A number of directions for future research were identified as a 
result of this study. Given the evidence from the literature review, investigating one or more of 
the potential barriers to formation would seem the most promising direction to pursue. 
Policy and Institutional Factors: Aside from a handful of case studies on successful worker 
cooperatives, little data exist on these organizations. Collecting data on worker cooperatives is 
difficult since they are apparently quite rare and there is some confusion about what constitutes a 
worker cooperative. A more promising approach might be to study 100% or majority-owned 
ESOPs. One approach could be to conduct a comparative case study of organizational forms 
within an industry in order to identify the advantages and disadvantages arising from 
organizational form. For example, if a set of home care businesses could be identified, worker 
cooperatives and similar conventional firms, data could be collected on key issues such as the 
distribution of profits, decision making processes, job satisfaction, job quality, productivity, and 
profitability, to shed light on how organizational form may affect these issues. 
Another promising area for study would analyze why there is such variation in the number and 
growth of worker cooperatives across states. Certainly differences in state tax and legal 
structures might be a factor. Other considerations include how existing worker cooperatives 
affect entry of new worker cooperatives, the role of worker cooperative developers, and 
concentration of other types of cooperatives (e.g., farmer-owned, consumer, housing) positively 
impacted the formation and growth of worker cooperatives. 
A related issue is the potential role of new “hybrid” cooperative firms (e.g., worker-community, 
limited cooperative associations) for facilitating employee-ownership in cooperatives. To what 
extent has investor participation in LCAs been motivated by community economic development 
concerns and how might this impact future development of worker cooperatives?  What is the 
role of worker-members in a multiple-stakeholder cooperative? 
Person-Organization Fit: The issue of self-selection, sorting, or person-organization fit is 
another area for future research. Individual workers may have different preferences for different 
organizational forms and may sort into the form that best suits their abilities and values 
(Williamson 1973). Trevor (2007) notes that person-organization fit predicts worker satisfaction 
and commitment, which in turn predicts voluntary turnover and performance. He proposes a 
study to explore which individuals are best suited to handle the decision making responsibilities 
and other membership duties required of member-workers in a worker cooperative. For example, 
potential workers at Mondragon are given an aptitude test to ensure they are a good fit for the 
cooperative (Corcoran and Wilson 2010). Perotin (2006) conjectures that there may be a limited 
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number of cooperatives a given environment can support. If worker fit is an issue, only a certain 
number of people will be happy working in a worker cooperative and the number of these people 
in a given area is finite. A related line of research could focus on characteristics of founding 
members of cooperatives in the framework of the growing literature on collective 
entrepreneurship. There is vast literature on the characteristics of individual entrepreneurs, but 
one question is whether cooperative (or collective) entrepreneurs have different traits than 
“primary” entrepreneurs? Identifying the skills, abilities, and personality traits of individuals 
more likely to prefer a worker cooperative environment, and the prevalence of these individuals 
in a region, or in a society as a whole, could inform cooperative development efforts and assist in 
targeting assistance to those most likely to succeed. 
IX. Conclusion 
There is a renewed interest in employee ownership, spurred in part by the recent recession, but 
also by more gradual changes in education levels, entrepreneurial activity, and the nature of work 
in the United States. This paper has reviewed the literature on worker cooperatives and presented 
some data on the geographic and industrial distribution of worker cooperatives. Despite the 
dearth of worker cooperatives currently in existence in the United States, we remain optimistic 
about the potential for future development of employee-owned cooperatives, particularly in rural 
states such as Iowa. 
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